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ABSTRACT
The enormous nancial success of online advertising platforms is
partially due to the precise targeting features they oer. Although
researchers and journalists have found many ways that advertisers
can target—or exclude—particular groups of users seeing their ads,
comparatively little attention has been paid to the implications
of the platform’s ad delivery process, comprised of the platform’s
choices about which users see which ads.
It has been hypothesized that this process can “skew” ad delivery
in ways that the advertisers do not intend, making some users less
likely than others to see particular ads based on their demographic
characteristics. In this paper, we demonstrate that such skewed
delivery occurs on Facebook, due to market and nancial optimiza-
tion eects as well as the platform’s own predictions about the
“relevance” of ads to dierent groups of users. We nd that both
the advertiser’s budget and the content of the ad each signicantly
contribute to the skew of Facebook’s ad delivery. Critically, we
observe signicant skew in delivery along gender and racial lines
for “real” ads for employment and housing opportunities despite
neutral targeting parameters.
Our results demonstrate previously unknown mechanisms that
can lead to potentially discriminatory ad delivery, even when ad-
vertisers set their targeting parameters to be highly inclusive. This
underscores the need for policymakers and platforms to carefully
consider the role of the ad delivery optimization run by ad platforms
themselves—and not just the targeting choices of advertisers—in
preventing discrimination in digital advertising.1
1 INTRODUCTION
Powerful digital advertising platforms fund most popular online
services today, serving ads to billions of users daily. At a high level,
the functionality of these advertising platforms can be divided into
two phases: ad creation, where advertisers submit the text and
images that comprise the content of their ad and choose targeting
parameters, and ad delivery, where the platform delivers ads to
specic users based on a number of factors, including advertisers’
budgets, their ads’ performance, and the predicted relevance of
their ads to users.
One of the underlying reasons for the popularity of these services
with advertisers is the rich suite of targeting features they oer
1The delivery statistics of ad campaigns described in this work can be accessed at
https://facebook-targeting.ccs.neu.edu/
∗ These two authors contributed equally
during ad creation, which allow advertisers to precisely specify
which users (called the audience) are eligible to see the advertiser’s
ad. The particular features that advertisers can use for targeting
vary across platforms, but often include demographic attributes,
behavioral information, users’ personally identiable information
(PII), mobile device IDs, and web tracking pixels [11, 72].
Due to the wide variety of targeting features—as well as the avail-
ability of sensitive targeting features such as user demographics
and interests—researchers have raised concerns about discrimina-
tion in advertising, where groups of users may be excluded from
receiving certain ads based on advertisers’ targeting choices [68].
This concern is particularly acute in the areas of credit, housing,
and employment, where there are legal protections in the U.S. that
prohibit discrimination against certain protected classes in adver-
tising [1–3]. As ProPublica demonstrated in 2016 [29], this risk
is not merely theoretical: ProPublica investigators were able to
run housing ads that explicitly excluded users with specic “ethnic
anities” from receiving them.2 Recently, the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) sued Facebook over these
concerns and others, accusing Facebook’s advertising platform of
“encouraging, enabling, and causing” violations of the Fair Housing
Act [28].
The role of ad delivery in discrimination Although re-
searchers and investigative journalists have devoted considerable
eort to understanding the potential discriminatory outcomes of
ad targeting, comparatively little eort has focused on ad delivery,
due to the diculty of studying its impacts without internal access
to ad platforms’ data and mechanisms. However, there are several
potential reasons why the ad delivery algorithms used by a platform
may open the door to discrimination.
First, consider that most platforms claim their aim is to show
users “relevant” ads: for example, Facebook states “we try to show
people the ads that are most pertinent to them” [67]. Intuitively,
the goal is to show ads that particular users are likely to engage
with, even in cases where the advertiser does not know a priori
which users are most receptive to their message. To accomplish
this, the platforms build extensive user interest proles and track
ad performance to understand how dierent users interact with
dierent ads. This historical data is then used to steer future ads
2In response, Facebook banned the use of certain attributes for housing ads, but many
other, un-banned, mechanisms exist for advertisers that achieve the same outcome [68].
Facebook agreed as part of a lawsuit settlement stemming from these issues to go
further by banning age, gender, and certain kinds of location targeting—as well as
some related attributes—for housing, employment, or credit ads [22].
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towards those users who are most likely to be interested in them,
and to users like them. However, in doing so, the platforms may
inadvertently cause ads to deliver primarily to a skewed subgroup
of the advertiser’s selected audience, an outcome that the advertiser
may not have intended or be aware of. As noted above, this is par-
ticularly concerning in the case of credit, housing, and employment,
where such skewed delivery might violate antidiscrimination laws.
Second, market eects and nancial optimization can play a role
in ad delivery, where dierent desirability of user populations and
unequal availability of users may lead to skewed ad delivery [25].
For example, it is well-known that certain users on advertising
platforms are more valuable to advertisers than others [47, 54, 64].
Thus, advertisers who choose low budgets when placing their ads
may be more likely to lose auctions for such “valuable” users than
advertisers who choose higher budgets. However, if these “valuable”
user demographics are strongly correlated with protected classes,
it could lead to discriminatory ad delivery due to the advertiser’s
budget alone. Even though a low budget advertiser may not have
intended to exclude such users, the ad delivery system may do just
that because of the higher demand for that subgroup.
Prior to this work, although hypothesized [25, 51, 71], it was not
known whether the above factors resulted in skewed ad delivery in
real-world advertising platforms. In fact, in response to the HUD
lawsuit [28] mentioned above, Facebook claimed that the agency
had “no evidence” of their ad delivery systems’ role in creating
discrimination [41].
Contributions In this paper, we aim to understand whether
ads could end up being shown in a skewed manner—i.e., where
some users are less likely than others to see ads based on their
demographic characteristics—due to the ad delivery phase alone.
In other words, we determine whether the ad delivery could cause
skewed delivery that an advertiser did not cause by their targeting
choices and may not even be aware of. We focus on Facebook—as it
is the most mature platform oering advanced targeting features—
and run dozens of ad campaigns, hundreds of ads with millions of
impressions, spending over $8,500 as part of our study.
Answering this question—especially without internal access to
the ad delivery algorithm, user data, and advertiser targeting data
or delivery statistics—involves overcoming a number of challenges.
These include separating market eects from optimization eects,
distinguishing ad delivery adjustments based on the ad’s perfor-
mance measured through user feedback from initial ad classication,
and developing techniques to determine the racial breakdown of the
delivery audience (which Facebook does not provide). The diculty
of solving these without the ad platform’s cooperation in a rigorous
manner may at least partially explain the lack of knowledge about
the potential discriminatory eects due to ad delivery to date. After
addressing these challenges, we nd the following:
First, we nd that skewed delivery can occur due to market eects
alone. Recall the hypothesis above concerning what may happen
if advertisers in general value users dierently across protected
classes. Indeed, we nd this is the case on Facebook: when we run
identical ads targeting the same audience but with varying budgets,
the resulting audience of users who end up seeing our ad can range
from over 55% men (for ads with very low budgets) to under 45%
men (for ads with high budgets).
Second, we nd that skewed delivery can occur due to the content of
the ad itself (i.e., the ad headline, text, and image, collectively called
the ad creative). For example, ads targeting the same audience but
that include a creative that would stereotypically be of the most
interest to men (e.g., bodybuilding) can deliver to over 80% men,
and those that include a creative that would stereotypically be of
the most interest to women (e.g., cosmetics) can deliver to over 90%
women. Similarly, ads referring to cultural content stereotypically
of most interest to Black users (e.g., hip-hop) can deliver to over
85% Black users, and those referring to content stereotypically of
interest to white users (e.g., country music) can deliver to over 80%
white users, even when targeted identically by the advertiser. Thus,
despite placing the same bid on the same audience, the advertiser’s
ad delivery can be heavily skewed based on the ad creative alone.
Third, we nd that the ad image itself has a signicant impact on
ad delivery. By running experiments where we swap dierent ad
headlines, text, and images, we demonstrate that the dierences in
ad delivery can be signicantly aected by the image alone. For
example, an ad whose headline and text would stereotypically be of
the most interest to men with the image that would stereotypically
be of the most interest to women delivers primarily to women
at the same rate as when all three ad creative components are
stereotypically of the most interest to women.
Fourth, we nd that the ad image is likely automatically classied
by Facebook, and that this classication can skew delivery from the
beginning of the ad’s run. We create a series of ads where we add an
alpha channel to stereotypically male and female images with over
98% transparency; the result is an image with all of the image data
present, but that looks like a blank white square to humans. We
nd that there are statistically signicant dierences in how these
ads are delivered depending on the image used, despite the ads
being visually indistinguishable to a human. This indicates that the
image classication—and, therefore, relevance determination—is
likely an automated process, and that the skew in ad delivery can
be due in large part to skew in Facebook’s automated estimate of
relevance, rather than ad viewers’ interactions with the ad.
Fifth, we show that real-world employment and housing ads can
experience signicantly skewed delivery. We create and run ads for
employment and housing opportunities, and use our methodology
to measure their delivery to users of dierent races and genders.
When optimizing for clicks, we nd that ads with the same targeting
options can deliver to vastly dierent racial and gender audiences
depending on the ad creative alone. In the most extreme cases, our
ads for jobs in the lumber industry reach an audience that is 72%
white and 90% male, our ads for cashier positions in supermarkets
reach an 85% female audience, and our ads for positions in taxi
companies reach a 75% Black audience, even though the targeted
audience specied by us as an advertiser is identical for all three.
We run a similar suite of ads for housing opportunities, and nd
skew there as well: despite the same targeting and budget, some of
our ads deliver to an audience of over 72% Black users, while others
delivery to over 51% Black users. While our results only speak
to how our particular ads are delivered (i.e., we cannot say how
housing or employment ads in general are delivered), the signicant
skew we observe even on a small set of ads suggests that real-world
housing and employment ads are likely to experience the same fate.
Taken together, our results paint a distressing picture of hereto-
fore unmeasured and unaddressed skew that can occur in online
advertising systems, which have signicant implications for dis-
crimination in targeted advertising. Specically, due to platforms’
optimization in the ad delivery stage together with market eects,
ads can unexpectedly be delivered to skewed subsets of the adver-
tiser’s specied audience. For certain types of ads, such skewed
delivery might implicate legal protections against discriminatory
advertising. For example, Section 230 of the U.S. Communications
Decency Act (CDA) protects publishers (including online platforms)
from being held responsible for third-party content. Our results
show Facebook’s integral role in shaping the delivery mechanism
and might make it more dicult for online platforms to present
themselves as neutral publishers in the future. We leave a full ex-
ploration of these implications to the legal community. However,
our results indicate that regulators, lawmakers, and the platforms
themselves need to think carefully when balancing the optimization
of ad platforms against desired societal outcomes, and remember
that ensuring that individual advertisers do not discriminate in
their targeting is insucient to achieve non-discrimination goals
sought by regulators and the public.
Ethics All of our experiments were conducted with careful
consideration of ethics. We obtained Institutional Review Board
review of our study at Northeastern University (application #18-11-
13), with our protocol being marked as “Exempt”. We minimized
harm to Facebook users when we were running our ads by always
running “real” ads (in the sense that if people clicked on our ads,
they were brought to real-world sites relevant to the topic of the
ad). While running our ads, we never intentionally chose to target
ads in a discriminatory manner (e.g., we never used discrimina-
tory targeting parameters). To further minimize the potential for
discrimination, we ran most of our experimental ads in categories
with no legal salience (such as entertainment and lifestyle); we
only ran ad campaigns on jobs and housing to verify whether the
eects we observed persist in these domains. We minimized harm
to the Facebook advertising platform by paying for ads and using
the ad reporting tools in the same manner as any other advertiser.
The particular sites we advertised were unaliated with the study,
and our ads were not defamatory, discriminatory, or suggestive of
discrimination.
2 BACKGROUND
Before introducing our methodology and analyses, we provide
background on online display advertising, describe Facebook’s ad-
vertising platform’s features, and detail related work.
2.1 Online display advertising
Online display advertising is now an ecosystem with aggregate
yearly revenues close to $100 billion [21]. The web advertising
ecosystem is a complex set of interactions between ad publishers,
ad networks, and ad exchanges, with an ever-growing set of entities
involved at each step allowing advertisers to reach much of the
web. In contrast, online services such as Facebook and Twitter
run advertising platforms that primarily serve a single site (namely,
Facebook and Twitter themselves). In this paper, we focus on single-
site advertising platforms, but our results may also be applicable
to more general display advertising on the web; we leave a full
investigation of the extent to which this is the case to future work.
The operation of platforms such as Facebook and Twitter can be
divided into two phases: ad creation and ad delivery. We provide
more details on each below.
Ad creation Ad creation refers to the process by which the
advertiser submits their ad to the advertising platform. At a high
level, the advertiser has to select three things when doing so:
(1) Ad contents: Advertisers will typically provide the ad head-
line, text, and any images/videos. Together, these are called
the ad creative. They will also provide the link where the
platform should send users who click.
(2) Audience Selection/Targeting: Advertisers need to select
which platform users they would like to see the ad (called
the audience).
(3) Bidding strategy: Advertisers need to specify how much
they are willing to pay to have their ads shown. This can
come in the form of a per-impression or per-click bid, or
the advertiser can simply place an overall bid cap and allow
the platform to bid on their behalf.
Once the advertiser has entered all of the above information, they
submit the ad for review;3 once it is approved, the ad will move to
the ad delivery phase.
Ad delivery Ad delivery refers to the process by which the
advertising platform shows ads to users. For every opportunity
to show a user an ad (e.g., an ad slot is available as the user is
browsing the service), the ad platform will run an ad auction to
determine, from among all of the ads that include the current user
in the audience, which ad should be shown.
In practice, however, the ad delivery process is somewhat more
complicated. First, the platforms try to avoid showing ads from
the same advertiser repeatedly in quick succession to the same
user; thus, the platforms will sometimes disregard bids for recent
winners of the same user. Second, the platforms often wish to show
users relevant ads; thus, rather than relying solely on the bid to
determine the winner of the auction, the platform may incorporate
a relevance score into consideration, occasionally allowing ads
with lower bids but more relevance to win over those with higher
bids. Third, the platforms may wish to evenly spread the advertiser
budget over their specied time period, rather than use it all at once,
which introduces additional complexities as to which ads should be
considered for particular auctions. The exact mechanisms by which
these issues are addressed are not well-described or documented
by the platforms.
Once ads enter the ad delivery phase, the advertising platforms
give advertisers information on how their ads are performing. Such
information may include detailed breakdowns (e.g., along demo-
graphic or geographic lines) of the characteristics of users to whom
their ad is being shown and those who click on the ad.
3Most platforms have a review process to prevent abuse or violations of their platforms’
advertising policies [7, 76].
Figure 1: Each ad has ve elements that the advertiser can
control: (1) the ad text, entered manually by the advertiser,
(2) the images and/or videos, (3) the domain, pulled auto-
matically from theHTML meta property og:site_name of the
destination URL, (4) the title, pulled automatically from the
HTML meta property og:title of the destination URL, and
(5) the description from meta property og:description of the
destination URL. The title and description can be manually
customized by the advertiser if they wish.
2.2 Facebook’s advertising platform
In this paper, we focus on Facebook’s advertising platform as it is
one of the most powerful and feature-rich advertising platforms
in use today. As such, we provide a bit more background here
about the specic features and options that Facebook provides to
advertisers.
Ad contents Each ad placed on Facebook must be linked to a
Page; advertisers are allowed to have multiple Pages and run ads for
any of them. Ads can come in multiple forms, such as promoting
particular posts on the page. However, for typical ads, the advertiser
must provide (a) the headline and text to accompany the ad, and (b)
one or more images or videos to show to the user. Optionally, the
advertiser can provide a trac destination to send the user to if they
click (e.g., a Facebook Page or an external URL); if the advertiser
provides a trac destination, the ad will include a brief description
(auto-generated from the HTML meta data) about this destination.
Examples showing all of these elements are presented in Figure 1.
Audience selection Facebook provides a wide variety of au-
dience selection (or targeting) options [10, 11, 37, 68]. In general,
these options fall into a small number of classes:
• Demographics and attributes: Similar to other advertising
platforms [38, 70], Facebook allows advertisers to select
audiences based on demographic information (e.g., age,
gender, and location), as well as prole information, ac-
tivity on the site, and data from third-parties. Recent
work has shown that Facebook oers over 1,000 well-
dened attributes and hundreds of thousands of free-form
attributes [68].
• Personal information: Alternatively, Facebook allows ad-
vertisers to specify the exact users who they wish to tar-
get by either (a) uploading the users’ personally identi-
able information including names, addresses, and dates
of birth [30, 72, 73], or (b) deploying web tracking pixels
on third-party sites [33]. On Facebook, audiences created
using either mechanism are called Custom Audiences.4
• Similar users: Advertisers may wish to nd “similar” users
to those who they have previously selected. To do so, Face-
book allows advertisers to create Lookalike Audiences5 by
starting with a source Custom Audience they had previ-
ously uploaded; Facebook then “identif[ies] the common
qualities of the people in it” and creates a new audience
with other people who share those qualities [34].
Advertisers can often combine many of these features together, for
example, by uploading a list of users’ personal information and then
using attribute-based targeting to further narrow the audience.
Objective and bidding Facebook provides advertisers with a
number of objectives to choose from when placing an ad [8], where
each tries to maximize a dierent optimization event the advertiser
wishes to occur. These include “Awareness” (simply optimizing for
the most impressions, a.k.a. views), “Consideration” (optimizing for
clicks, engagement, etc.), and “Conversion” (optimizing for sales
generated by clicking the ad). For each objective, the advertiser
bids on the objective itself (e.g., for “Awareness”, the advertiser
would bid on ad impressions). The bid can take multiple forms, and
includes the start and end time of the ad campaign and either a
lifetime or a daily budget cap. With these budget caps, Facebook
places bids in ad auctions on the advertisers’ behalf. Advertisers can
optionally specify a per-bid cap as well, which will limit the amount
Facebook would bid on their behalf for a single optimization event.
Facebook’s ad auction When Facebook has ad slots available,
it runs an ad auction among the active advertisements bidding for
that user. However, the auction does not just use the bids placed
by the advertisers; Facebook says [35]:
The ad that wins an auction and gets shown is the
one with the highest total value [emphasis added].
Total value isn’t how much an advertiser is willing
to pay us to show their ad. It’s combination of 3
major factors: (1) Bid, (2) Estimated action rates,
and (3) Ad quality and relevance.
Facebook denes “Estimated action rates” as “how well an ad per-
forms”, meaning whether or not users in general are engaging with
the ad [5]. They dene “Ad quality and relevance” as “how inter-
esting or useful we think a given user is going to nd a given ad”,
meaning how much a particular user is likely to be interested in
the ad [5].
Thus, it is clear that Facebook attempts to identify the users
within an advertiser’s selected audience who they believe would
nd the ad most useful (i.e., those who are most likely to result in
4Google, Twitter, and Pinterest all provide similar features; these are called Customer
Match [6], Tailored Audiences, and Customer Lists [60], respectively.
5Google and Pinterest oer similar features: on Google it is called Similar Audi-
ences [39], and on Pinterest it is called Actalike Audiences [62].
an optimization event) and shows the ad preferentially to those
users. Facebook says exactly as such in their documentation [4]:
During ad set creation, you chose a target audience
... and an optimization event ... We show your ad
to people in that target audience who are likely to
get you that optimization event
Facebook provides advertisers with an overview of how well-
matched it believes an ad is with the target audience using a metric
called relevance score, which ranges between 1 and 10. Facebook
says [67]:
Relevance score is calculated based on the positive
and negative feedback we expect an ad to receive
from its target audience.
Facebook goes on to say [67]:
Put simply, the higher an ad’s relevance score, the
less it will cost to be delivered. This is because our
ad delivery system is designed to show the right
content to the right people, and a high relevance
score is seen by the system as a positive signal.
Statistics and reporting Facebook provides advertisers with
a feature-rich interface [26] as well as a dedicated API [55] for
both launching ads and monitoring those ads as they are in ad
delivery. Both the interface and the API give semi-live updates
on delivery, showing the number of impressions and optimization
events as the ad is running. Advertisers can also request this data
be broken down along a number of dierent dimensions, including
age, gender, and location (Designated Market Area [57], or DMA,
region). Notably, the interface and API do not provide a breakdown
of ad delivery along racial lines; thus, analyzing delivery along
racial lines necessitates development of a separate methodology
that we describe in the next section.
Anti-discrimination rules In response to issues of potential
discrimination in online advertising reported by researchers and
journalists [29], Facebook currently has several policies in place
to avoid discrimination for certain types of ads. Facebook also
recently built tools to automatically detect ads oering housing,
employment, and credit, and pledged to prevent the use of certain
targeting categories with those ads. [45]. Additionally, Facebook
relies on advertisers to self-certify [15] that they are not in viola-
tion of Facebook’s advertising policy prohibitions against discrim-
inatory practices [27]. More recently, in order to settle multiple
lawsuits stemming from these reports, Facebook no longer allows
age, gender, or ZIP code-based targeting for housing, employment
or credit ads, and blocks other detailed targeting attributes that are
“describing or appearing to relate to protected classes” [22, 44, 59].
2.3 Related work
Next, we detail related work on algorithm auditing, transparency,
and discriminatory ad targeting.
Auditing algorithms for fairness Following the growing
ubiquity of algorithms in daily life, a community formed around
investigating their societal impacts [65]. Typically, the algorithms
under study are not available to outside auditors for direct exam-
ination; thus, most researchers treat them as “black boxes” and
observe their reactions to dierent inputs. Among most notable
results, researchers have shown price discrimination in online retail
sites [42], gender discrimination in job sites [16, 43], stereotypical
gender roles re-enforced by online translation services [12] and im-
age search [46], disparate performance on gender classication for
Black women [13], and political partisanships in search [20, 50, 63].
Although most of the work focused exclusively on the algorithms
themselves, recently researchers began to point out that auditors
should consider the entire socio-technical systems that include the
users of those algorithms, an approach referred to as “algorithm-
in-the-loop” [40, 66]. Furthermore, recent work has demonstrated
that fairness is not necessarily composable, i.e., for several notions
of fairness such as individual fairness [24], a collection of classiers
that are fair in isolation do not necessarily result in a fair outcome
when they are used as part of a larger system [25].
Advertising transparency In parallel to the developments in
detecting and correcting unfairness, researchers have conducted
studies and introduced tools with the aim of increasing transparency
and explainability of algorithms and their outcomes. For example,
much attention has been dedicated to shedding light on the factors
that inuence the targeting of a particular ad on the web [52, 53,
61, 78] and on specic services [19, 77].
Focusing on Facebook, Andreou et al. investigated the trans-
parency initiative from Facebook that purportedly tells users
why they see particular targeted ads [11]. They found that the
provided explanations are incomplete and, at times, misleading.
Venkatadri et al. introduced the tool called “TREADS” that at-
tempts to close this gap by providing Facebook users with detailed
descriptions of their inferred attributes using the ads themselves
as a vehicle [74]. Further, they investigated how data from third-
party data brokers is used in Facebook’s targeting features and—for
the rst time—revealed those third-party attributes to the users
themselves using TREADS [75]. Similar to other recent work [58],
Venkatadri et al. found that the data from third-party data brokers
had varying accuracy [75].
Discrimination in advertising As described above, Facebook
has some policies and tools in place to prevent discriminatory ad
targeting. However, advertisers can still exclude users based on a
variety of interests that are highly correlated with race by using
custom audiences [68], or by using location [36, 49]. Separately,
Sweeney [69] and Datta et al. [19] have studied discrimination in
Google’s advertising system.
The work just described deals with identifying possibilities for
the advertisers to run discriminatory ads using the platform’s fea-
tures. In contrast, other researchers, as well as and HUD’s re-
cent complaint, have suggested that discrimination may be intro-
duced by the ad platform itself, rather than by a malicious adver-
tiser [19, 41, 51, 71]. For example, Lambrecht et al. ran a series of
ads for STEM education and found they were consistently delivered
more to men than to women, even though there are more female
users on Facebook, and they are known to be more likely to click
on ads and generate conversions [51]. Datta et al. explored ways
that discrimination could arise in the targeting and delivery of
job-related ads, and analyzed how dierent parties might be liable
under existing law [18]. Our work explores these ndings in depth,
separating market eects from optimization eects and exploring
the mechanisms by which ads are delivered in a skewed manner.
3 METHODOLOGY
We now describe our methodology for measuring the delivery of
Facebook ads. At a high level, our goal is to run groups of ads where
we vary a particular feature, with the goal of then measuring how
changing that feature skews the set of users the Facebook platform
delivers the ad to. To do so, we need to carefully control which users
are in our target audience. We also need to develop a methodology
to measure the ad delivery skew along racial lines, which, unlike
gender, is not provided by Facebook’s existing reporting tools. We
detail how we achieve that in the following sections.
3.1 Audience selection
When running ads, we often wish to control exactly which ad
auctions we are participating in. For example, if we are running
multiple instances of the same ad (e.g., to establish statistical con-
dence), we do not want the instances to be competing against
each other. To this end, we use random PII-based custom audiences,
where we randomly select U.S. Facebook users to be included in
mutually-exclusive audiences. By doing so, we can ensure that our
ads are only competing against each other in the cases where we
wish them to. We also replicate some of the experiments while
targeting all U.S. users to ensure that the eects do not only exist
when custom audiences are targeted. As we show later in Section 4,
we observe equivalent skews in these scenarios, which leads us to
believe that preventing internal competition between our own ads
is not crucial to measure the resulting skews.
Generating custom audiences We create each custom audi-
ence by randomly generating 20 lists of 1,000,000 distinct, valid
North American phone numbers (+1 XXX XXX XXXX, using known-
valid area codes). Facebook reported that they were able to match
approximately 220,000 users on each of the 20 lists we uploaded.
Initially, we used these custom audiences directly to run ads, but
while conducting the experiments we noticed that—even though
we specically target only North American phone numbers—many
ads were delivered to users outside of North America. This could be
caused by users traveling abroad, users registering with fake phone
numbers or with online phone number services, or for other reasons,
whose investigation is outside the scope of this paper. Therefore,
for all the experiments where we target custom audiences, we
additionally limit them to people located in the U.S.
3.2 Data collection
Once one of our ad campaigns is run, we use the Facebook Market-
ing API to obtain the delivery performance statistics of the ad every
two minutes. When we make this request, we ask Facebook to
break down the ad delivery performance according to the attribute
of study (age, gender, or location). Facebook’s response to each
query features the following elds, among others, for each of the
demographic attributes that we requested:
• impressions: The number of times the ad was shown
• reach: The number of unique users the ad was shown to
• clicks: The number of clicks the ad has received
• unique_clicks: The number of unique users who clicked
Throughout the rest of the paper, we use the reach value when
examining delivery; thus, when we report “Fraction of men in the
audience” we calculate this as the reach of men divided by the sum
of the reach of men and the reach of women (see Section 3.5 for
discussion on using binary values for gender).
3.3 Measuring racial ad delivery
The Facebook Marketing API allows advertisers to request a break-
down of ad delivery performance along a number of axes but it does
not provide a breakdown based on race. However, for the purposes
of this work, we are able to measure the ad delivery breakdown
along racial lines by using location (Designated Market Area, or
DMA6) as a proxy.
Similar to prior work [68], we obtain voter records from North
Carolina; these are publicly available records that have the name,
address, race, and often phone number of each registered voter in
the state. We partition the most populated North Carolina DMAs
into two sets; for the exact DMAs, please see Table 1. We ensure
that each racial group (white and Black) from a set of DMAs has
a matching number of records of the other group in the other set
of DMAs. We sample three audiences (A, B, and C) that t these
constraints from the voter records and upload as separate Custom
Audiences to Facebook.7 Audiences A and B are disjoint from
each other; audience C contains the voters from A with additional
white voters from the rst DMA set and Black voters from the
second DMA set. We create audiences in this way to be able to test
both “ipped” versions of the audiences (A and B), as well as large
audiences with as many users as possible (C); we created audience
B as large as possible (exhausting all voters who t the necessary
criteria), and sampled audience A to match its size. The details of
the resulting audiences are shown in Table 1.
When we run ads where we want to examine the ad delivery
along racial lines, we run the ads to one audience (A, B, or C).
We then request that Facebook’s Marketing API deliver us results
broken down by DMA. Because we selected DMAs to be a proxy
for race, we can use the results to infer which custom audience
they were originally in, allowing us to determine the racial makeup
of the audience who saw (and clicked on) the ad. Note that in
experiments that involve measuring racial skew all ads target the
same target audience. The limited number of registered voters does
not allow us to create many large, disjoint custom audiences like we
do in other experiments. However, as we show with ads targeting
all U.S. users, internal competition does not appear to inuence the
results.
3.4 Ad campaigns
We use the Facebook Ad API described in Section 2.2 to create all
ads for our experiments and to collect data on their delivery. We
6Designated Market Areas [57] are groups of U.S. counties that Neilson denes as
“market areas”; they were originally used to signify a region where users receive similar
broadcast television and radio stations. Facebook reports ad delivery by location using
DMAs, so we use them here as well.
7Unfortunately, Facebook does not report the number of these users who match as we
use multiple PII elds in the upload le [72].
DMA(s) [57]
# Records (A) # Records (B) # Records (C)
White Black White Black White Black
Wilmington,
Raleigh–Durham 400,000 0 0 400,000 900,002 0
Greenville-Spartanburg,
Greenville-New Bern,
Charlotte, Greensboro
0 400,000 400,000 0 0 892,097
Table 1: Overview of the North Carolina custom audiences used to measure racial delivery. We divide the most populated
DMAs in the state into two sets, and create three audiences each with one race per DMA set. Audiences A and B are disjoint
from each other; audience C contains the voters from A with additional white voters from the rst DMA set and Black voters
from the second DMA set. We then use the statistics Facebook reports about delivery by DMAs to infer delivery by race.
carefully control for any time-of-day eects that might be present
due to dierent user demographics using Facebook at dierent
times of the day: for any given experiment, we run all ads at the
same time to ensure that any such eects are experienced equally
by all ads. Unless otherwise noted, we used the following settings:
• Objective: Consideration→Trac8
• Optimization Goal: Link Clicks
• Trac destination: An external website (that depends on
the ads run)
• Creative: All of our ads had a single image and text relevant
to the ad.
• Audience selection: We use custom audiences for many of
our ads, as described in Section 3.1, and further restrict
them to adult (18+) users of all genders residing in the
United States. For other ads, we target all U.S. users age 18
or older.
• Budget: We ran most ads with a budget of $20 per day, and
stopped them typically after six hours.
3.5 Measuring and comparing audiences
We now describe the measurements we make during our experi-
ments and how we compute their condence intervals.
Binary values of gender and race Facebook’s marketing API
reports “female”, “male”, and “uncategorized” as the possible val-
ues for gender. Facebook’s users self-report their gender, and the
available values are “female”, “male”, and “custom”. The latter al-
lows the user to manually type in their gender (with 60 predened
gender identities suggested through auto-complete functionality)
and select the preferred pronoun from “female - her”, “male - him”,
and “neutral - them”. Across our experiments, we observe that
up to 1% of the audiences are reported as “uncategorized” gender.
According to Facebook’s documentation this represents the users
who did not not list their gender.9 We do not know whether the
8This target is dened as: Send more people to a destination on or o Facebook such
as a website, app, or Messenger conversation.
9https://www.facebook.com/business/help/151999381652364
“uncategorized” gender also features users with self-reported “cus-
tom” gender. Thus, in this work we only consider the self-reported
binary gender values of “female” and “male”.
Further, when considering racial bias, we use the self-reported
information from voter records. The data we obtained has 7,560,885
individuals, with 93% reporting their race as either Black or
White. Among those, less than 1% report their ethnicity as “His-
panic/Latino”. Thus, in this work, we only target the individuals
with self-reported race of White or Black. However, when running
our experiments measuring race (and targeting specic DMAs), we
observe that a fraction (∼10%) of our ads are delivered to audiences
outside of our predened DMAs, thus making it impossible for us
to infer their race. This fraction remains fairly consistent across our
experiments regardless of what we advertise, thus introducing the
same amount of noise across our measurements. This is not entirely
unexpected, as we are targeting users directly, and those users may
be traveling, may have moved, may have outdated information in
the voter le, etc.
We do not claim that gender or race are binary, but choose to
focus the analysis on users who self-reported their gender as “fe-
male” or “male” and race as “Black” or “White”. This way, we report
the observable skew in delivery only along these axes. We recog-
nize that delivery can be further skewed with respect to gender of
non-binary users and/or users of other races in a way that remains
unreported in this work.
Measuring statistical signicance Using the binary race and
gender features, throughout this work, we describe the audiences
by the fraction of male users and the fraction of white users. We
calculate the lower and upper limits of the 99% condence interval
around this fraction using the method recommended by Agresti
and Coull [9], dened in Equation 1:
L.L. =
pˆ +
z2α /2
2n − zα/2
√
pˆ(1−pˆ)
n +
z2α /2
4n2
1 + z2α/2/n
,
U .L. =
pˆ +
z2α /2
2n + zα/2
√
pˆ(1−pˆ)
n +
z2α /2
4n2
1 + z2α/2/n
,
(1)
where L.L. is the lower condence limit, U .L. is the upper con-
dence limit, pˆ is the observed fraction of the audience with the
attribute (here: male), n is the size of the audience reached by the
ad. To obtain the 99% interval we set zα/2 = 2.576. The advantage
of using this calculation instead of the more frequently used normal
approximation
p ± zα/2
√
pˆ(1 − pˆ)
n
(2)
is that the resulting intervals fall in the (0, 1) range. Whenever the
condence intervals around these fractions for two audiences are
non-overlapping, we can make a claim that the gender or racial
makeups of two audiences are signicantly dierent [17]. However,
the converse is not true: overlapping condence intervals do not
necessarily mean that the means are not dierent (see Figure 4
in [17] for explanation). In this work we report all the results of our
experiments but for easier interpretation emphasize those where
the condence intervals are non-overlapping. We further conrm
that the non-overlapping condence intervals represent statistically
signicant dierences, using the dierence of proportion test as
shown in Equation 3:
Z =
(pˆ1 − pˆ2) − 0√
pˆ(1 − pˆ)( 1n1 + 1n2 )
(3)
where pˆ1 and pˆ2 are the fractions of men (white users) in the two au-
diences that we compare, n1 and n2 are sizes of these audiences, and
pˆ is the fraction of men (white users) in the two delivery audiences
combined. All the results we refer to as statistically signicant are
signicant in this test with a Z -score of at least 2.576. Finally, as we
present in the Appendix, the comparisons presented are statistically
signicant also after the application of Bonferroni correction [14]
for multiple hypotheses testing.
Note that in experiments where we run multiple instances of an
ad targeting disjoint custom audiences, the values of pˆ and n are
calculated from the sums of reached audiences.
4 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we explore how an advertiser’s choice of ad creative
(headline, text, and image) and ad campaign settings (bidding strat-
egy, targeted audience) can aect the demographics (gender and
race) of the users to whom the ad is ultimately delivered.
4.1 Budget eects on ad delivery
We begin by examining the impact that market eects can have
on delivery, aiming to test the hypothesis put forth by Lambrecht
et al. [51]. In particular, they observed that their ads were predomi-
nantly shown to men even though women had consistently higher
click through rates (CTRs). They then hypothesized that the higher
CTRs led to women being more expensive to advertise to, meaning
they were more likely to lose auctions for women when compared
to auctions for men.
We test this hypothesis by running the same ad campaign with
dierent budgets; our goal is to measure the eect that the daily
budget alone has on the makeup of users who see the ads. When
running these experiments, we keep the ad creative and targeted
audience constant, only changing the bidding strategy to give Face-
book dierent daily limits (thus, any ad delivery dierences can be
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Figure 2: Gender distributions of the audience depend on
the daily budget of an ad, with higher budgets leading to
a higher fraction of women. The left graph shows an ex-
periment where we target all users located in the U.S.; the
right graph shows an experiment where we target our ran-
dom phone number custom audiences.
attributed to the budget alone). We run an ad with daily budget
limits of $1, $2, $5, $10, $20, and $50, and run multiple instances at
each budget limit for statistical condence. Finally, we run the ex-
periment twice, once targeting our random phone number custom
audiences, and once targeting all users located in U.S.; we do so to
verify that any eect we see is not a function of our particular target
audience, and that it persists also when non-custom audiences are
targeted.
Figure 2 presents the results, plotting the daily budget we specify
versus the resulting fraction of men in the audience. The left graph
shows the results when we target all users located in the U.S., and
the right graph shows the results when we target the random phone
number custom audiences. In both cases, we observe that changes
in ad delivery due to dierences in budget are indeed happening:
the higher the daily budget, the smaller the fraction of men in the
audience, with the Pearson’s correlation of ρ = −0.88, pval < 10−5
for all U.S. users and ρ = −0.73, pval < 10−3 for the custom
audiences.
The stronger eect we see when targeting all U.S. users may be
due to the additional freedom that the ad delivery system has when
choosing who to deliver to, as this is a signicantly larger audience.
To eliminate the impact that market eects can have on delivery
in our following experiments, we ensure that all runs of a given ex-
periment use the same bidding strategy and budget limit. Typically
we use a daily budget of $20 per campaign.
4.2 Ad creative eects on ad delivery
Now we examine the eect that the ad creative (headline, text, and
image) can have on ad delivery. To do so, we create two stereo-
typical ads that we believe would appeal primarily to men and
women, respectively: one ad focusing on bodybuilding and another
on cosmetics. The actual ads themselves are shown in Figure 1. We
run each of the ads at the same time and with the same bidding
strategy and budget. For each variable we target dierent custom
audiences, i.e., the “base” level ads target one audience, “text” level
ads target another, etc. Note that we do not explicitly target either
ad based on gender; the only targeting restrictions we stipulate are
18+ year old users in the U.S.
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Figure 3: “Base” ad contains a link to a page about either
bodybuilding or cosmetics, a blank image, no text, or head-
line. There is a small dierence in the fraction ofmale users
for the base ads, and adding the “text” only decreases it. Set-
ting the “headline” sets the two ads apart but the audience
of each is still not signicantly dierent than that of the
base version. Finally, setting the ad “image” causes drastic
changes: the bodybuilding ad is shown to a 91% male audi-
ence, the cosmetics ad is shown to a 5% male audience, de-
spite the same target audience.
We observe dramatic dierences in ad delivery, even though the
bidding strategy is the same for all ads, and each pair of ads target
the same gender-agnostic audience. In particular, the bodybuilding
ad ended up being delivered to over 75% men on average, while
the cosmetics ad ended up being delivered to over 90% women on
average. Again, this skewed delivery is despite the fact that we—the
advertiser—did not specify dierence in budget or target audience.
Individual components’ impact on ad delivery With the
knowledge that the ad creative can skew delivery, we dig deeper to
determinewhich of the components of the ad creative (headline, text,
and image) have the greatest eect on ad delivery. To do so, we stick
with the bodybuilding and cosmetics ads, and “turn o” various
features of the ad creative by replacing them with empty strings or
blank images. For example, the bodybuilding experiment listed as
“base” includes an empty headline, empty ad text, and a blank white
image; it does however link to the domain bodybuilding.com.
Similarly, the cosmetics experiment listed as “base” includes no
headline, text, or image, but does link to the domain elle.com. We
then add back various parts of the ad creative, as shown in Figure 1.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 3. Error
bars in the gure correspond to 99% condence intervals as dened
in Equation 1. All results are shown relative to that experiment’s
“base” ad containing only the destination URL. We make a number
of observations. First, we can observe an ad delivery dierence due
to the destination URL itself; the base bodybuilding ad delivers to
48% men, while the base cosmetics ad delivers to 40% men. Second,
as we add back the title and the headline, the ad delivery does not
appreciably change from the baseline. However, once we introduce
the image into the ad, the delivery changes dramatically, returning
to the level of skewed delivery discussed above (over 75% male for
bodybuilding, and over 90% female for cosmetics). When we add
the text and/or the headline back alongside the image, the skew of
delivery does not change signicantly compared to the presence of
image only. Overall, our results demonstrate that the choice of ad
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Figure 4: Ad delivery of original bodybuilding and cosmetics
ads, as well as the same ads with incongruent images. Skew
in delivery is observed from the beginning, and using incon-
gruent images skews the delivery to a lesser degree.
image can have a dramatic eect on which users in the audience
ultimately are shown the ad.
Swapping images To further explore how the choice of im-
age impacts ad delivery, we continue using the bodybuilding and
cosmetics ads, and test how ads with incongruent images and text
are delivered. Specically, we swap the images between the two
ads, running an ad with the bodybuilding headline, text, and des-
tination link, but with the image from cosmetics (and vice versa).
We also run the original ads (with congruent images and text) for
comparison.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 4, showing
the skew in delivery of the ads over time. The color of the lines
indicates the image that is shown in the ad; solid lines represent the
delivery of ads with images consistent with the description, while
dotted lines show the delivery for ads where image was replaced.
We make a number of observations. First, when using congruent ad
text and image (solid lines), we observe the skew we observed before.
However, we can now see clearly that this delivery skew appears
to exist from the very beginning of the ad delivery, i.e., before users
begin viewing and interacting with our ads. We will explore this
further in the following section. Second, we see that when we switch
the images—resulting in incongruent ads (dotted lines)—the skew
still exists but to a lesser degree. Notably, we observe that the ad
with an image of bodybuilding but cosmetics text delivers closest
to 50:50 across genders, but the ad with the image of cosmetics
but bodybuilding text does not. The exact mechanism by which
Facebook decides to use the ad text and images in inuencing ad
delivery is unknown, and we leave a full exploration to future work.
Swapping images mid-experiment Facebook allows adver-
tisers to change their ad while it is running, for example, to up-
date the image or text. As a nal point of analysis, we examine
how changing the ad creative mid-experiment—after it has started
running—aects ad delivery. To do so, we begin the experiment
with the original congruent bodybuilding and cosmetics ads; we
let these run for over six hours. We then swap the images on the
running ads, thereby making the ads incongruent, and examine
how ad delivery changes.
Figure 5 presents the results of this experiment. In the top graph,
we show the instantaneous ad delivery skew: as expected, the
congruent ads start to deliver in a skewed manner as we have
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Figure 5: When we ip the image in the middle of the cam-
paign, the ad is reclassied and shown to an updated audi-
ence. Here, we start bodybuilding and cosmetics ads with
corresponding descriptions and after 6 hours and 32 min-
utes we ip the images. Within an hour of the change, the
gender proportions are reversed, while there is no signi-
cant dierence between the click through rates per gender
pre and post ipping of the images.
previously seen. After the image swap at six hours, we notice
a very rapid change in delivery with the ads almost completely
ipping in ad delivery skew in a short period of time. Interestingly,
we do not observe a signicant change in users’ behavior to explain
this swap: the bottom graph plots the click through rates (CTRs) for
both ads by men and women over time. Thus, our results suggest
that the change in ad delivery skew is unlikely to be due to the
users’ responses to the ads.
4.3 Source of ad delivery skew
We just observed that ads see a signicant skew in ad delivery due
to the contents of the ad, despite the bidding strategy and targeting
parameters being held constant. However, we observed that the ad
delivery skew was present from the very beginning of ad delivery,
and that swapping the image in the middle of a run resulted in a
very rapid change in ad delivery that could not be explained by
how frequently users click on our ads. We now turn to explore the
mechanism that may be leading to this ad delivery skew.
Almost-transparent images We begin with the hypothesis
that Facebook itself is automatically classifying the ad creative (in-
cluding the image), and using the output of this classication to
calculate a predicted relevance score to users. In other words, we
hypothesize that Facebook is running automatic text and image
Masculine Feminine
No. Visible Invisible Visible Invisible
1
2
3
4
5
Table 2: Diagram of the images used in the transparency ex-
periments. Shown are the ve stereotypical masculine and
feminine images, along with the same images with a 98% al-
pha channel, denoted as invisible. The images with the al-
pha channel are almost invisible to humans, but are still de-
livered in a skewed manner.
classication, rather than (say) relying on the ad’s initial perfor-
mance, which would explain (a) the delivery skew being present
from the beginning of ad delivery, and (b) how the delivery changes
rapidly despite no signicant observable change in user behavior.
However, validating this hypothesis is tricky, as we are not privy
to all of Facebook’s ad performance data.
To test this hypothesis, we take an alternate approach. We use
the alpha channel that is present in many modern image formats;
this is an additional channel that allows the image to encode the
transparency of each pixel. Thus, if we take an image and add an
alpha channel with (say) 99% opacity, all of the image data will still
be present in the image, but any human who views the image would
not be able to see it (as the image would show almost completely
transparent). However, if an automatic classier exists, and if that
classier is not properly programmed to handle the alpha channel,
it may continue to classify the image.
Test images To test our hypothesis, we select ve images that
would stereotypically be of interest to men and ve images that
would stereotypically be of interest to women; these are shown in
the second and fourth columns of Table 2.10, 11 We convert them
10All of these images were cropped from images posted to pexels.com, which allow
free non-commercial use.
11We cropped these images to the Facebook-recommended resolution of 1,080×1,080
pixels to reduce the probability Facebook would resample the image.
to PNG format add an alpha channel with 98% opacity12 to each
of these images; these are shown in the third and fth columns of
Table 2. Because we cannot render a transparent image without
a background, the versions in the paper are rendered on top of
a white background. As the reader can see, these images are not
discernible to the human eye.
We rst ran a series of tests to observe how Facebook’s ad cre-
ation phase handled us uploading such transparent images. If we
used Reach as our ad objective, we found that Facebook “attened”
these images onto a white background in the ad preview.13 By
targeting ourselves with these Reach ads, we veried that when
they were shown to users on the Facebook mobile app or in the
desktop Facebook web feed, the images did indeed show up as
white squares. Thus, we can use this methodology to test whether
there is an automatic image classier present by examining whether
running dierent transparent white ads results in dierent delivery.
Results We run ads with all twenty of the images in Table 2,
alongside ads with ve truly blank white images for comparison.
For all 25 of these ads, we hold the ad headline, text, and destination
link constant, run them all at the same time, and use the same
bidding strategy and target custom audiences in a way that each
user is potentially exposed to up to three ads (one masculine image,
one feminine image, and one blank image). We then record the
dierences in ad delivery of these 25 images along gender lines. The
results are presented in Figure 6A, with all ve images in each of the
ve groups aggregated together. We can observe that ad delivery
is, in fact, skewed, with the ads with stereotypically masculine
images delivering to over 43% men and the ads with feminine images
delivering to 39% men in the experiment targeting custom audiences
as well as 58% and 44% respectively in the experiment targeting all
U.S. users. Error bars in the plot correspond to the 99% condence
interval calculated using Equation 1.
Interestingly, we also observe that the masculine invisible ads
appear to be indistinguishable in the gender breakdown of their
delivery from the masculine visible ads, and the feminine invisi-
ble ads appear to be indistinguishable in their delivery from the
feminine visible ads.
As shown in Figure 6A, we verify that the fraction of men in
the delivery of the male ads is signicantly higher than in female-
centered and neutral ads, as well as higher in neutral ads than
in female-centered ads. We also show that we cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the fraction of men in the two versions of
each ad (one visible, one invisible) are the same. Thus, we can
conclude that the dierence in ad delivery of our invisible male
and female images is statistically signicant, despite the fact that
humans would not be able to perceive any dierences in these ads.
This strongly suggests that our hypothesis is correct: that Facebook
has an automated image classication mechanism in place that is
12We were unable to use 100% transparency as we found that Facebook would run
an image hash over the uploaded images and would detect dierent images with
100% opacity to be the same (and would refuse to upload it again). By using 98%
transparency, we ensure that the images were still almost invisible to humans but that
Facebook would not detect they were the same image.
13Interestingly, we found that if we instead used Trac as our ad objective, Facebook
would both “atten” these images onto a white background and then normalize the
contrast. This caused the ads to be visible to humans—simply with less detail that the
original ads—thus defeating the experiment. We are unsure of why Facebook did not
choose to normalize images with the objective for Reach.
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Figure 6: Fraction of reached men in the audiences for ads
with the images fromTable 2, targeting random phone num-
ber custom audience (A) and US audience (B). The solid
markers are visible images, and the hollow markers are the
same images with 98% opacity. Also shown is the delivery to
truly white images (“blank”). We can observe that a dier-
ence in ad delivery exists, and that that dierence is statisti-
cally signicant between the masculine and feminine invis-
ible images. This suggests that automated image classica-
tion is taking place.
used to steer dierent ads towards dierent subsets of the user
population.14
To conrm this nding, we re-run the same experiment except
that we change the target audience from our random phone number
custom audiences (hundreds of thousands of users) to all U.S. users
(over 320 million users). Our theory is that if we give Facebook’s
algorithm a larger set of auctions to compete in, any eect of skewed
delivery would be amplied as they may be able to nd more users
for whom the ad is highly “relevant”. In Figure 6B we observe that
the ad delivery dierences are, indeed, even greater: the male visible
and invisible images deliver to approximately 60% men, while the
female visible and invisible images deliver to approximately 45%
men. Moreover, the statistical signicance of this experiment is
even stronger, with a Z value over 10 for the ad delivery dierence
between the male invisible and female invisible ads.
4.4 Impact on real ads
We have observed that dierences in the ad headline, text, and
image can lead to dramatic dierence in ad delivery, despite the
bidding strategy and target audience of the advertiser remaining
the same. However, all of our experiments thus far were on test ads
where we typically changed only a single variable. We now turn
to examine the impact that ad delivery can have on realistic ads,
where all properties of the ad creative can vary.
Entertainment ads We begin by constructing a series of benign
entertainment ads that, while holding targeting parameters xed
(targeting custom audience C from Table 1, are stereotypically of
interest to dierent races. Namely, we run three ads leading to lists
of best albums in the previous year: general top 30 (neutral), top
14It is important to note we not know exactly how the classication works. For example,
the classier may also be programmed to take in the “attened” images that appear
almost white, but there may sucient data present in the images for the classication
to work. We leave a full exploration of how exactly the classier is implemented to
future work.
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Figure 7: We run three campaigns about the best selling al-
bums. Top 30 is neutral, targeting all. Country implicitly tar-
gets white users, and Hip-hop implicitly targets Black users.
Facebook classication picks up on the implicit targeting
and shows it to the audience we would expect.
country music (stereotypically of interest mostly to white users),
and top hip-hop albums (stereotypically of interest mostly to Black
users). We nd that Facebook ad delivery follows the stereotypical
distribution, despite all ads being targeted in the same manner and
using the same bidding strategy. Figure 7 shows the fraction of
white users in the audience in the three dierent ads, treating race
as a binary (Black users constitute the remaining fraction). Error
bars represent 99% condence intervals calculated using Equation 1.
Neutral ads are seen by a relatively balanced, 45% white audience,
while the audiences receiving the country and hip-hop ads are 80%
and 13% white, respectively. Assuming signicant population level
dierences of preferences, it can be argued that this experiment
highlights the “relevance” measures embedded in ad delivery work-
ing as intended. Next, we investigate cases where such dierences
may not be desired.
Employment ads Next, we advertise eleven dierent generic
job types: articial intelligence developer, doctor, janitor, lawyer,
lumberjack, nurse, preschool teacher, restaurant cashier, secretary,
supermarket clerk, and taxi driver. For each ad, we customize the
text, headline, and image as a real employment ad would. For
example, we advertise for taxi drivers with the text “Begin your
career as a taxi driver or a chaueur and get people to places on
time.” For each ad, we link users to the appropriate category of job
listings on a real-world job site.
When selecting the ad image for each job type, we select ve
dierent stock photo images: one that has a white male, one that
has a white female, one that has a black male, one that has a black
female, and one that is appropriate for the job type but has no
people in it. We run each of these ve independently to test a
representative set of ads for each job type, looking to see how
they are delivered along gender and racial lines (targeting custom
audience C from Table 1). We run these ads for 24 hours, using the
objective of Trac, all targeting the same audience with the same
bidding strategy.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 8, plotting
the distribution of each of our ads along gender (left graph) and
racial (right graph) lines. As before, the error bars represent the
99% condence interval calculated using Eq. 1. We can immediately
observe drastic dierences in ad delivery across our ads along both
racial and gender lines: our ve ads for positions in the lumber
industry deliver to over 90% men and to over 70% white users
in aggregate, while our ve ads for janitors deliver to over 65%
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Figure 8: Results for employment ads, showing a breakdown
of ad delivery by gender (left gure) and race (right gure)
in the ultimate delivery audience. The labels refer to the
race/gender of the person in the ad image (if any). The jobs
themselves are ordered by the average fraction of men or
white users in the audience. Despite the same bidding strat-
egy, the same target audience, and being run at the same
time, we observe signicant skew along on both racial and
gender lines due to the content of the ad alone.
women and over 75% black users in aggregate. Recall that the only
dierence between these ads are the ad creative and destination
link; we (the advertiser) used the same bidding strategy and target
audience, and ran all ads at the same time.
Furthermore, we note that the skew in delivery cannot merely
be explained by possibly dierent levels of competition from other
advertisers for white and Black users or for male and female users.
Although it is the case that each user may be targeted by a dierent
number of advertisers with varying bid levels, by virtue of running
all of our job ads at the same time, targeting the same users, with
the same budget, we are ensuring that our ads are experiencing
competition from other advertisers identically. In other words, our
ad targeting asks that every user who is considered for our “lumber-
jack” job ad should also be considered for our taxi driver job ad, so
these ads should be competing with each other and facing identical
competition from other advertisers at auction time. If the content
of the ad was not taken into account by the delivery optimization
system, then the ads would be expected to have similar—though
not necessarily even—breakdowns by race and gender at delivery.
Our experiment demonstrates that this is not the case, and thus,
aspects of ad delivery optimization, rather than merely advertiser
competition, inuence the skew in the delivery outcome.
Housing ads Finally, we create a suite of ads that advertise
a variety of housing opportunities, as discrimination in online
housing ads has recently been a source of concern [28]. We vary
the type of property advertised (rental vs. purchase) and the implied
cost (xer-upper vs. luxury). In each ad, the cost is implied through
wording of the ad as well as the accompanying image. Each ad
points to a listing of houses for sale or rental apartments in North
Carolina on a real-world housing site. Simultaneously, we ran a
baseline ad with generic (non-housing) text that simply links to
google.com. All of the ads ran for 12 hours, using the objective
of Trac, all targeting the same North Carolina audiences and
using the same bidding strategy. We construct the experiment such
that each particular ad is run twice: once targeting audience A and
once targeting audience B (see Table 1) This way we eliminate any
potential geographical eects (for example, users in Wilmington
could be interested in cheap houses to buy, and users in Charlotte
could be interested in luxury rentals regardless of their ethnicity,
but if we only used audience C that eect could appear as racial
skew).
We present the results in Figure 9 (we found little skew for
the housing ads along gender lines, and we omit those results).
We observe signicant ad delivery skew along racial lines in the
delivery of our ads, with certain ads delivering to an audience of
over 72% Black users (comparable to the baseline results) while
others delivering to an audience of as little as 51% Black users.
As with the employment ads, we cannot make claims about what
particular properties of our ads lead to this skew, or about how
housing ads in general are delivered. However, given the signicant
skew we observe with our suite of ads, it indicates the further study
is needed to understand how real-world housing ads are delivered.
5 CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
To date, the public debate and ad platform’s comments about dis-
crimination in digital advertising have focused heavily on the tar-
geting features oered by advertising platforms, and the ways that
advertisers can misuse those features [23].
In this paper, we set out to investigate a dierent question: to
what degree and bywhatmeansmay advertising platforms themselves
play a role in creating discriminatory outcomes?
Our study oers an improved understanding of the mechanisms
behind and impact of ad delivery, a process distinct from ad creation
and targeting. While ad targeting is facilitated by an advertising
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Figure 9: Results for housing ads, showing a breakdown in
the ad delivery audience by race. Despite being targeted in
the same manner, using the same bidding strategy, and be-
ing run at the same time, we observe signicant skew in the
makeup of the audience to whom the ad is delivered (rang-
ing from estimated 27% white users for luxury rental ads to
49% for cheap house purchase ads).
platform—but nominally controlled by advertisers—ad delivery is
conducted and controlled by the advertising platform itself. We
demonstrate that, during the ad delivery phase, advertising plat-
forms can play an independent, central role in creating skewed, and
potentially discriminatory, outcomes. More concretely, we have:
• Replicated and armed prior research suggesting that mar-
ket and pricing dynamics can create conditions that lead to
dierential outcomes, by showing that the lower the daily
budget for an ad, the fewer women it is delivered to.
• Shown that Facebook’s ad delivery process can signi-
cantly alter the audience the ad is delivered to compared
to the one intended by the advertiser based on the content
of the ad itself. We used public voter record data to demon-
strate that broadly and inclusively targeted ads can end
up being dierentially delivered to specic audience seg-
ments, even when we hold the budget and target audience
constant.
• Demonstrated that skewed ad delivery can start at the be-
ginning of an ad’s run. We also showed that this process is
likely automated on Facebook’s side, and is not a reection
of the early feedback received from users in response to
the ad, by using transparent images in ads that appear the
same to humans but are distinguishable by automatic im-
age classication tools, and showing they result in skewed
delivery.
• Conrmed that skewed delivery can take place on real-
world ads for housing and employment opportunities by
running a series of employment ads and housing ads with
the same targeting parameters and bidding strategy. De-
spite diering only in the ad creative and destination link,
we observed skewed delivery along racial and gender lines.
We briey discuss some limitations of our work and touch on the
broader implications of our ndings.
Limitations It is important to note that while we have revealed
certain aspects of how ad delivery is accomplished, and the eects
it had on our experimental ad campaigns, we cannot make broad
conclusions about how it impacts ads more generally. For example,
we observe that all of our ads for lumberjacks deliver to an audience
of primarily white and male users, but that may not hold true of all
ads for lumberjacks. However, the signicant ad delivery skew that
we observe for our employment and housing ads strongly suggests
that such skew is present for such ads run by real-world advertisers.
Skew vs. discrimination Throughout this paper we refer to
dierences in the demographics of reached audience as “skew” in
delivery. We do not claim any observed skew per se is necessarily
wrong or should be mitigated. Without making value judgements
on skew in general, we do emphasize the distinct case of ads for
housing and employment. In particular, the skew we observe in the
delivery of ads for cosmetics or bodybuilding might be interpreted
as reinforcing gender stereotypes but is unlikely to have legal im-
plications. On the other hand, the skew in delivery of employment
and housing ads is potentially discriminatory in a legal sense.
Further, for the experiments involving ethnicity, we attempted to
create equally sized audiences (50% white and 50% Black). However,
solely the fact that ads are not delivered to an evenly split audience
does not indicate skew, as there might be dierences in matching
rates (what fraction of registered voters are active Facebook users)
per ethnicity, or the groups could have dierent temporal usage
patterns. Only when we run two or more ads at the same time, tar-
geting the same audience, and these ads are delivered with dierent
proportions to white and Black users, do we claim we observe skew
in delivery.
Our focus lies in understanding the extent to which the ad
platform’s delivery optimization, rather than merely its targeting
tools and their use as implied by Facebook [23], determine the out-
comes of ad delivery, and on highlighting that demographic skews
presently arise for certain legally protected categories in Facebook,
even when the advertiser targets broadly and inclusively.
Skew in traditional media Showing ads to individuals most
likely to engage with them is one of the cornerstone promises of on-
line ad platforms. While in traditional media—such as newspapers
and television—advertisers can also place their ads strategically to
reach particular kinds of readers or viewers, there are three signi-
cant dierences with implications for fairness and discrimination
when compared to advertising on Facebook.
First, when advertising in traditional media, the advertiser has
the ability to purposefully advertise to a wide and diverse audience,
and be assured that their ads will reach that audience. As we show
in this work, this is not the case for advertising on Facebook. Even if
the advertiser intends to reach a general and diverse audience, their
ad can be steered to a narrow slice within that specied audience,
that is skewed in unexpected or undesirable ways.
Second, the individual’s agency to see ads targeted at groups they
do not belong to is more severely limited in the hyper-targeted
and delivery-optimized scenario of online ad platforms. In tradi-
tional media, an individual interested in seeing ads targeted to a
dierent demographic than they belong to has to merely watch
programming or read a newspaper that they are not usually a tar-
get demographic for. On Facebook, nding out what ads one may
be missing out on due to gender, race, or other characteristic in-
ferred or predicted by Facebook is more challenging. A particularly
motivated user could change their self-reported gender but might
nd themselves discouraged from doing so because the account’s
gender information is always public. Other characteristics, such
as race and net worth, are inferred by Facebook (or accessed via
third-party companies [75]) rather than obtained through user’s
self-reported data, which makes them challenging to alter for the
purposes of seeing ads. Moreover, although users can remove some
of their inferred interests using ad controls on Facebook, they have
no ability to control negative inferences Facebook may be making
about them. For example, Facebook may infer that a particular user
is “not interested in working at a lumber yard”, and therefore, not
show this user ads for a lumberjack job even if the employer is
trying to reach them. As a result, Facebook would be excluding
them from an opportunity in ways unbeknownst to the user and to
the advertiser.
Third, public interest scrutiny of the results of advertising is
much more dicult in online delivery-optimized systems than in
traditional media. Advertising in traditional media can be easily ob-
served and analyzed by many members of society, from individuals
to journalists, and targeting and delivery outside the expectation
norms can be detected and called out by many. In the case of
hyper-targeted online advertising whose delivery is controlled by
the platform, such scrutiny is currently outside reach for most
ads [32, 56].
Policy implications Our ndings underscore the need for pol-
icymakers and platforms to carefully consider the role of the opti-
mizations run by the platforms themselves—and not just the target-
ing choices of advertisers—in seeking to prevent discrimination in
digital advertising.
First, because discrimination can arise in ad delivery indepen-
dently from ad targeting, limitations on ad targeting—such as those
currently deployed by Facebook to limit the targeting features that
can be used—will not address discrimination arising from ad deliv-
ery. On the contrary, to the extent limiting ad targeting features
prompts advertisers to rely on larger target audiences, the mecha-
nisms of ad delivery will have an even greater practical impact on
the ads that users see.
Second, regulators, lawmakers, and platforms themselves will
need to more deeply consider whether and how longstanding civil
rights laws apply to modern advertising platforms in light of ad
delivery dynamics. At a high level, U.S. federal law prohibits dis-
crimination in the marketing of housing, employment and credit
opportunities. A detailed consideration of these legal regimes is
beyond the scope of this paper. However, our ndings show that
ad platforms themselves can shape access to information about
important life opportunities in ways that might present a challenge
to equal opportunity goals.
Third, in the U.S., Section 230 of the Communications Decency
Act (CDA) provides broad legal immunity for internet platforms
acting as publishers of third-party content. This immunity was a
central issue in recently-settled litigation against Facebook, who
argued its ad platform should be protected by CDA Section 230 in
part because its advertisers are “wholly responsible for deciding
where, how, and when to publish their ads.” [31] Our research shows
that this claim is misleading, particularly in light of Facebook’s role
in determining the ad delivery outcomes. Even absent unlawful
behavior by advertisers, our research demonstrates that Facebook’s
own, independent actions during the delivery phase are crucial to
determining how, when, and to whom ads are shown, and might
produce unlawful outcomes. These eects can be invisible to, and
might even create liability for, Facebook’s advertisers.
Thus, the eects we observed could introduce new liability for
Facebook. In determining whether Section 230 protections ap-
ply, courts consider whether an internet platform “materially con-
tributes” to the alleged illegal conduct. Courts have yet to squarely
consider how the delivery mechanisms described in this paper
might aect an ad platform’s immunity under Section 230.
Fourth, our results emphasize the need for increased trans-
parency into advertising platforms, particularly around ad delivery
algorithms and statistics for real-world housing, credit, or employ-
ment ads. Facebook’s existing ad transparency eorts are not yet
sucient to allow researchers to analyze the impact of ad delivery
in the real world.
Potential mitigations Given the potential impact that discrim-
inatory ad delivery can have on exposure to opportunities available
to dierent populations, a natural question is how ad platforms such
as Facebook may mitigate these eects. This is not straightforward,
and is likely to require increased commitment and transparency
from ad platforms as well as development of new algorithmic and
machine learning techniques. For instance, as we have demon-
strated empirically in Section 4.1 (and as [25] have shown theoreti-
cally), skewed ad delivery can occur even if the ad platform refrains
from rening the audience supplied by the advertisers according to
the predicted relevance of the ad to individual users. This happens
because dierent users are valued dierently by advertisers, which,
in a setting of limited user attention, leads to a tension between
providing a useful service for users and advertisers, fair ad delivery,
and the platform’s own revenue goals.15
Thus, more advanced and nuanced approaches to addressing the
potential issues of discrimination in digital advertising are neces-
sary. Developing them is beyond the scope of this paper; however,
we can imagine several dierent options, each with their own pros
and cons. First, Facebook and similar platforms could disable op-
timization altogether for some ads, and deliver them to a random
sample of users within an advertiser’s target audience (with or with-
out market considerations). Second, platforms could remove ads in
protected categories from their normal ad ows altogether, and pro-
vide those listings in a separate kind of marketing product (e.g., , a
user-directed listing service like craigslist.org). Third, the plat-
forms could allow the advertisers to enforce their own demographic
outcomes so long as those desired outcomes don’t themselves vio-
late anti-discrimination laws. Finally, the platforms could seek to
constrain their delivery optimization algorithms to satisfy chosen
fairness criteria (some candidates for such criteria from the theo-
retical computer science community are individual fairness [24]
and preference-informed fairness [48], but a broader discussion of
appropriate criteria involving policymakers is needed).
Digital advertising increasingly inuences how people are ex-
posed to the world and its opportunities, and helps keep online
services free of monetary cost. At the same time, its potential for
15A formal statement of this claim for the theoretical notions of individual fairness [24]
and its generalization, preference-informed fairness, can be found in [48].
negative impacts, through optimization due to ad delivery, is grow-
ing. Lawmakers, regulators, and the ad platforms themselves need
to address these issues head-on.
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ERRATA
v2: In the version of the paper published on April 3rd, 2019 we
wrongly stated in Section 3.5 that ∼40-50% of ads were delivered
outside of our predened DMAs. In version v2 we corrected this
gure to ∼10%. Further, in response to a request from Facebook,
we changed the axis labels from “Fraction of white users in the
audience” to “Estimated fraction of white users in the audience”.
v4: We changed the method of calculating condence intervals
from normal approximation to the method described by Agresti
and Coull [9]. All condence intervals presented in the gures
throughout the paper use this method. The change does not aect
any of the conclusions. Notably, after the change the condence
intervals in Figure 4 no longer cross 0.
v5: Includes the feedback and requested changes from anonymoys
reviewers. The content is identical to this accepted at Computer-
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) 2019.
APPENDIX
Multiple hypotheses testing. In the experiment described
in the main paper we ran ads for 11 dierent job postings, each
with ve variations of the accompanying image. Here, we conrm
that the apparent dierences are not an eect of testing multiple
hypotheses. We do so by aggregating the ve variants for each ad
and comparing the fraction of men and the estimated fraction of
white users between each for pairs of jobs. This results in 55 tests,
so rather than using the Z value corresponding to pval = 0.01,
we use the Bonferroni correction [14], a statistical technique used
to address the problem of making multiple comparisons. In Fig-
ure 10 we show that the majority of comparisons remain statisti-
cally signicant, each at the Z value corresponding to corrected
pval =
0.01
55 ≈ 0.0002.
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